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I. INTRODUCTION
Korea's legal and regulatory landscape is one that has experienced
monumental changes over the past several decades. The country has dealt
with a series of political and socio-economic challenges, and is moving
rapidly closer to the level of economic development of a developed country.
Following the economic crisis in 1997 that shook the Asian region, and
recognizing the need to restructure its economy into one based on market
competition, Korea has been working towards eliminating governmental
intervention, entry barriers, and other anti-competitive elements from its
markets and reforming costly and inefficient economic structures, thus
hastening the transformation of its previously government-led economy into
a more market-based one. At the heart of this audacious restructuring
endeavor has been Korea's competition law and policy. Korea's
competition law has strong regulatory legal instruments to curb the
economic concentration of Korea's business conglomerates, or chaebol. A
unique feature of Korea's competition policy has been to overhaul their
corporate governance. Korea has also significantly augmented its
enforcement activities in all of the major areas of competition law-cartel
investigation, merger review, and regulation of the abuse of market
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dominance. As a prime example of such increased enforcement activities,
on December 7, 2005, Korea's Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC") found
Microsoft Corporation guilty of abuse of market dominance and levied a
fine of approximately $30 million and a corrective measure that is more
stringent on Microsoft than that of the European Commission. '
Additionally, in response to increased globalization, the KFTC has
expanded its jurisdictional reach overseas to cope with the anti-competitive
behaviors of foreign nations or corporations that threaten the welfare of
Korean consumers.
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of competition law
and competition policy in Korea and to analyze their relationship with other
important national economic policies. Section II provides a historical
survey of the country's competition law and policy. Section III examines
the major components of the law and evaluates how the antitrust authority
has actually enforced its provisions in practice. It also highlights elements
of the law that have been tailored to Korea's unique economic
circumstances. Section IV focuses on the relationship between competition
policy and related economic policies-in particular, industrial policy and
trade and investment policy-and gives some case studies. Section V
discusses Korea's recent expansion of its antitrust jurisdiction beyond its
own territory. Section VI offers some policy suggestions for other
developing Asian countries based on the Korean experience with
competition policy.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITION POLICY IN KOREA
A. The 1960's and 1970's: The Early History of Competition Policy
In the early 1960's, after serious political turbulence ending in a
military coup, Korea's new government launched its first five-year
economic development plan.2 To promote the growth of selected labor-
intensive, export-oriented industries, the government provided strong
financial and tax incentives for companies engaged in export businesses,
while enforcing tight control on imports. By the time the second five-year
economic development plan came to an end in 1971, the economy was
recording annual economic growth of approximately 10%.
3
In the late 1960's, concerned about growing protectionism among
Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, The Findings of the Microsoft Case
(Dec. 7, 2005), at http://www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/microsoft-case.pdf [hereinafter KFTC
Press Release].
2 South Korea - Economic Plans, http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-
12300.html.
3 KFTC, HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET ORIENTED ECONOMY 12 (2001);
BON Ho Koo, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE KOREA ECONOMY 184 (1991).
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major trading partners, such as the United States, and the international
competitiveness of Korea's labor-intensive light manufacturing industries,
which were under threat from other emerging economies, the government
enacted legislation to shift the focus to heavy manufacturing industries.
The Industrial Machinery Promotion Act of 1967, the Shipbuilding
Promotion Act of 1967, the Electrical Industry Promotion Act of 1969, the
Steel Industry Promotion Act of 1970, and the Petrochemical Industry
Promotion Act of 1970 demonstrated the government's commitment to
developing the heavy manufacturing sector by providing preferential
treatment to the industries covered by these laws. The heavy and chemical
industry ("HCI") drive was formally launched in 1973 and continued well
into the late 1970's. 4  The government directed significant financial
resources and tax incentives toward these industries, marginalizing labor-
intensive, light manufacturing industries in the process. 5 It encouraged a
handful of companies that had performed well under the first two five-year
economic development plans to enter major HCIs selected by the
government.6
Korea recorded annual growth of 9.6% throughout the 1970's, but this
high rate of economic growth coincided with deepening macroeconomic
imbalances and microeconomic inefficiencies. 7 The first and second oil
shocks took a heavy toll on the economy, which was reliant on foreign raw
materials.8 Excessive investment in equipment and facilities during the
HCI drive, a construction boom in the Middle East that increased the money
supply in Korea as workers repatriated their earnings, and the government's
price support policy for rice led to high levels of inflation that worsened the
currency account balance. 9 Excessive investment and persistent
government policy throughout the 1960's and 1970's of setting high entry
and exit barriers for strategic industrial sectors solidified monopolistic and
oligopolistic market structures and caused an inefficient allocation of
resources. 10 The selective economic strategy pursued in this era also
propelled the formation of the chaebol-Korea's family-owned industrial
conglomerates, including global giants like Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and
SK-further accelerating the concentration of economic power. The share
of the ten largest chaebol rose from 5.1% of GDP at the beginning of the
4 Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
6 Id.
7 JUNG-HO Yoo, THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF THE 1970S AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 37-39,44 (1990).
8 KFTC, supra note 3, at 33; Koo, supra note 3, at 220-24; Kwang Shik Shin & Seung
Wha Chang, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
30 (1998), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/661 .pdf.
9 KFTC, supra note 3, at 33-34 (2001); Koo, supra note 3, at 215-18.
1° Id.
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HCI drive to over 10% by the end."
Against this backdrop, the government believed that to maintain
economic growth in an expanding market, it needed to create a more
competitive industrial environment. Its initial attempts to diffuse criticism
of the country's monopolistic and oligopolistic markets were formulated
during the course of rapid economic development in the 1960's. 12 In 1963,
the Sambun case stirred a public outcry, leading to a public consensus on
the need to contain monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior.' 3 This case
involved several large producers of wheat flour, sugar, and cement for the
domestic market who were able to charge three to four times the listed price
for goods by sustaining chronic shortages of supply.14 Not only were they
earning excessive profits, they were also practicing widespread tax
evasion. 15
To deal with problems of this type, in 1964 the government released a
draft of a new competition law made up of 29 articles.' 6 The law proposed
the establishment of a competition watchdog to regulate prices and contract
terms. 17 The Economic and Planning Board-the powerful bureaucratic
agency in charge of economic development throughout the 1960's and
1970's-was to be in charge of the new agency.' 8 Due to strong objections
from the business sector, however, this bill failed to be placed on the
cabinet agenda, a necessary step before it could be referred to the National
Assembly. 19 In 1966, the government submitted a new bill in which the
competition watchdog would play only an advisory role.20 As significant a
setback as this was, the bill was not even considered by the National
Assembly and was automatically discarded when the session ended in June
1967.21 The government reintroduced the bill in August 1967, but once
again it failed in the face of fierce lobbying from business.
22
In 1968, a National Assembly investigation into the misuse of foreign
capital focused public attention on another case of consumer exploitation
and excessive profits.23 Sinjin, a monopolistic automobile manufacturer
that had obtained a commercial loan from a foreign entity, was accused of
I IIL SAKONG, KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 247 (1993).
12 KFTC, supra note 3, at 4-6.
13 id.
14 Id. at 4, n.1.
15 Id.
16 KFTC, supra note 3, at 14.
17 Id.
18 id.
19 Id. at 14.
20 Id. at 16.
21 id.
22 KFTC, supra note 3, at 16.
23 Id. at 5.
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selling its Korona cars in the domestic market at approximately four times
the international price.24 The government seized the opportunity to submit
another competition law bill, but this was automatically discarded when the
session ended in June 1971.25 This time, business successfully argued that a
competition law would be premature at a time when the goal of the Korean
economy was to accumulate industrial capital and facilitate the free flow of
products to the market.26
The early 1970's witnessed widespread inflation caused by a
worldwide oversupply of the dollar, the first oil shock, and rampant
cartelization around the globe.27 The government tried hard to stabilize
domestic prices by raising exchange rates and domestic oil prices, but this
only aggravated price instability. 2" As part of its price stabilization plan,
the government once again submitted a bill to the National Assembly
proposing a competition watchdog under the Economic and Planning
Board, composed of representatives from both government and the private
sector. 29 This bill failed when the president dissolved the National
Assembly using his emergency powers in late 1972.30
In late 1975, to address the issue of continuing inflation caused in part
by the previous increases in exchange rates, the government enacted the
Price Stabilization and Fair Trade Act. Although the act aimed to stabilize
prices and ensure fair trade, in practice most resources were expended in the
former area. Nevertheless it failed to accomplish its putative goals of
reining in prices and creating fair markets. In late 1979, a series of
unprecedented political events took place in Korea, including the
assassination of the incumbent president. 3' After the military coup, the
ruling elites who formed the new government wanted to project a new
vision for Korean society. Bearing in mind the problems caused by the
growth-first strategy of the 1960's and 1970's, the government undertook
numerous social and economic reforms. These included, notably, the
enactment of the Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade Act ("MRFTA") in
1980, which took effect in 1981.32 This was a significant achievement
24 At the time, government approval was required to obtain a loan from a foreign entity.
What enraged the public in this instance was that Sinjin was not only granted the privilege of
having its request for a foreign loan approved but the company was also reaping excessive
profits on domestic sales of its cars.
25 KFTC, supra note 3, at 18.
26 id.
27 Id. at 18.
28 Id.
29 Id.
3 Id at 24-25.
31 EDWARD M. GRAHAM, REFORMING KOREA'S INDUSTRIAL CONGLOMERATES 38 (2003).
32 Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade Act, No. 4198 (1990) (S. Korea) [hereinafter
MRFTA].
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considering the fierce lobbying it faced from businesses and the objections
raised by other government agencies also charged with industrial policy.
The passage of the MRFTA heralded a new phrase in the regulation of
monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior and represented a major step on the
path to a more balanced and equitable society. The MRFTA garnered
overwhelming support from the media and consumer organizations, if not
from businesses.
B. The Early 1980's to 1997: Regulation of Economic Concentration
Despite the enactment of the MRFTA, which had been intended to
control mergers and regulate market-dominating behavior, the economic
concentration of the chaebol did not abate.33 Rather, the market share in
terms of turnover of the thirty largest chaebol in the mining and
manufacturing sector increased from 34.1% in 1977 to 40.8% in 1985, as
seen in Table 1.34 The cross-shareholdings and cross-debt guarantees of the
chaebol continued to expand "like the tentacles of an octopus." By the
early 1980's, the public's opinion of the chaebol was souring noticeably. 35
The strong, growth-first strategy of the previous two decades had greatly
alleviated poverty, and the general public was beginning to take more of an
interest in wealth distribution and equity issues. A cross-section of society,
from workers to intellectuals, now held the view that the chaebol had made
their fortunes br virtue of cozy relations with politics and by exploiting the
Korean people.
The then-ruling Democratic Justice Party also shared in this negative
view of conglomerates.37 The expansion of the chaebol into all areas of
business was hampering the sound growth of small- and medium-sized
enterprises ("SMEs"), the bedrock of the Korean economy. The over-
concentration of the chaebol and their practice of transmitting wealth
through inheritance raised questions about their legitimacy and created
distrust in the economic system and in politics. 38 Thus, the issue of the
chaebol was not confined to the economic sphere, but had political and
social dimensions as well.39
In the mid-1980's the Korean economy was faring well with the help
33 KFTC, supra note 3, at 35-37.
34 DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, KOREA REBUILDS: FROM CRISIS TO
OPPORTUNITY 199 (1999), available at www.dfat.gov.au/publications/korearebuilds/
korea.pdf.
35 SO MEE SUNG & KWANGSHIK SHIN, TWENTY YEARS OF COMPETITION POLICY 5 (2001).36 Id. at 5--6.
37 See GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 74-76.
38 K.U. Lee, Economic Development and Competition Policy in Korea, I WASH U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 67, 67-68 (2002).
" Id. at 68.
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of the "three lows": low interest rates, low oil prices, and a low dollar.4 ° In
this benign environment, the government, plagued by questions about its
legitimacy, took the bold step of instituting a new legal system to regulate
the chaebol. Chapter 3 of the MRFTA, created in 1986, was entitled
"Regulation of Economic Concentration" and contained a series of
provisions to regulate "large-scale companies."' 1 These included a limit on
holding companies, a ban on (direct) cross-shareholdings, and a ceiling on
the total amount of investment that could be carried out by chaebol.
42
Because the latter provision greatly restricted the chaebol's entry into new
areas of business, the chaebol has made unrelenting efforts to have the limit
eased or lifted ever since.
These sweeping legislative changes did not alleviate economic
concentration.43 In 1989, the number of chaebol with assets of more than
Korean won 400 billion was 43, 11 more than in 1987.44 Over the same
two-year period, the number of chaebol-affiliated companies increased
from 509 to 673. 45 The total amount of mutual investment among affiliates
surged from Korean won 3.3 trillion to Korean won 16.97 trillion, to
account for 28.1% of the net asset value of the fourty-three chaebol.46 The
share of total turnover of the thirty largest chaebol in the mining and
manufacturing sector was 39.6% in 1994, again revealing no sign of a
slowdown in economic concentration.47
Until the financial crisis of 1997-98, the government continued to
tighten its regulations on chaebol to address the problem of unrelenting
economic concentration. In 1992, a provision tightening the restrictions on
debt guarantees among chaebol affiliates was promulgated to prevent them
from excessive debt financing that might undermine their financial
structure.48 In 1996, a new provision was added to the MRFTA to curb
inside transactions among affiliated companies that were not based on
arm's-length valuations. None of these attempts to stem the tide of
economic concentration met with much success, however.
40 SuNG & SHIN, supra note 35, at 38.
41 KFTC, supra note 3, at 85; SUNG & SHIN, supra note 35, at 7-8.
42 KFTC, supra note 3, at 78-83; SUNG & SHIN, supra note 35, at 8.
43 KFTC, supra note 3, at 89.
4HWANG & SEO, CHAEBOL GOVERNANCE AND REFORM IN KOREA 365 (2000).
41 Id. at 364.
46 Hee-young Song, Chaebol, Widening Octopus Expansion, CHOSUN DAILY, Jun. 6
1989.
47 KFTC, supra note 3, at 95.
48 Lee, supra note 38, at 70.
49 KFTC, supra note 3, at 130-33.
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C. 1997 to the Present: Economic Restructuring and Competition Policy
In the face of the intense turmoil brought about by the financial crisis
of 1997-98 and under pressure from the IMF, the government amended the
MRFTA to facilitate economic and corporate restructuring.5" It abolished
(but later reinstated) the limit on the total amount of investment, flatly
prohibited debt guarantees among affiliated companies, and lifted the
restriction on holding companies, though with strict conditions.51
There is a strongly held view that the chaebol were the main cause of
the financial crisis in Korea, leading to IMF supervision. The economy has
rebounded nicely since 1999, but the question of how to view and deal with
the chaebol is still clouded in controversy and awaits further research.52
Whether or not they were the main culprit in the crisis, the chaebol remain
at the heart of the Korean economy. The top thirty chaebol are engaged in
businesses spread across twenty or so major industries and have more than
600 affiliates.53 Their total assets comprise over 45% of all corporate assets
in Korea.
The government now appears to take the view that economic
concentration is closely related to issues of corporate governance, and that
regulation of economic concentration under the MRFTA should therefore
give way to regulation under general commercial law in the future when the
corporate governance of chaebol is sufficiently improved. In early 2004 it
announced an ambitious 'roadmap for market reform' under which it would
lift most of the restrictions relating to economic concentration once certain
conditions, such as transparency in corporate governance, were met.54
III. AN OVERVIEW OF KOREA'S COMPETITION LAW
A. Objectives
Article 1 of the MRFTA defines its purpose as being:
to promote fair and free competition, to thereby encourage creative
enterprising activities, to protect consumers, and to strive for
balanced development of the national economy by preventing the
abuse of market-dominating positions by enterprises and the
excessive concentration of economic power, and by regulating undue
collaborative acts and unfair trade practices.
50 KFTC, supra note 3, at 169-70.
51 Id.
52 See GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 126-127.
53 See KFTC, supra note 3, at 360, Table 2.
54 KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, 2005 FAIR TRADE WHITE PAPER 3 (2005) [hereinafter
KFTC WHITE PAPER].
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Therefore, Korean competition law can be said to pursue multiple
objectives in addition to the promotion of economic efficiency, which is
arguably the sole concern of U.S. antitrust law.55
Certain provisions in the MRFTA can sensibly be explained only when
one assumes that the act pursues diverse social goals. For instance, the
KFTC-the government agency established under the MRFTA to enforce
its provisions-has dealt with unfair trade practices in a way that protects
economically weaker enterprises, indicating that maximizing economic
efficiency is not its sole objective. An examination of the guidelines it has
promulgated on specific issue areas, such as large retail stores and
newspapers, confirms this view. The diverse values the MRFTA embraces
are also apparent in the act's exceptions and exemptions from antitrust
disciplines. A clause in the cartel regulations, for example, exempts
collaborative behavior designed to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs. 6
The most glaring example of the MRFTA's non-efficiency-oriented
goals is the set of provisions on the concentration of economic power in
Chapter 3 of the act. The chapter addresses the pathologies supposedly
emanating from the chaebol, such as cross-share holding, debt guarantees,
and equity investment among affiliates.57 The act also contains a provision
to ensure arm's-length transactions among the affiliates of large business
groups. In short, it can be argued that the MRFTA has broad objectives that
go beyond its putative goals of promoting economic efficiency and
maximizing consumer welfare.
Nevertheless, in terms of priority, increasingly such socio-political
objectives appear to play a minimal role in the process of the KFTC's
enforcement except for regulation of economic concentration and certain
regulations on unfair trade practices. In other words, in traditional areas of
antitrust enforcement, such as merger review, cartel investigation, and
abuse of market dominance, socio-political considerations rarely come to
the fore in the KFTC's enforcement, making them only secondary to the
goal of promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
5 8
55 Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp argue as follows:
Today it seems clear that the general goal of the antitrust law is to promote 'competition' as
the economist understands that term. Thus we say that the principal objective of antitrust
policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively, while
yet permitting them to take advantage of ever available economy that comes from internal or
jointly created production efficiencies, or from innovation producing new processes or new
or improved products.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1 00a (2d ed. 2000) (1978).
56 MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 19 (2)(6).
57 Id.
58 SUNG & SHIN, supra note 35, at 56-57.
695
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:687 (2006)
B. Major Legislation
The MRFTA is the central legislation in place designed exclusively to
deal with competition law and policy. The MRFTA encompasses all of the
traditional aspects of competition policy that are the subject of competition
law in other countries, such as anti-competitive mergers, cartels,
monopolization, resale price maintenance, and exclusive dealing
arrangements. 59 In addition, it addresses certain aspects of economic
concentration in the Korean economy by regulating undue subsidies, debt
guarantees, and equity investment among chaebol affiliates.6 °
Additionally, many other laws make up Korean competition law in a
broader sense. For instance, both the Telecommunications Business Act and
the Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry contain
provisions to regulate merger and acquisition ("M&A") activity in the
telecommunications and financial industries. The Unfair Competition
Prevention Act of 1961 regulates competition in the area of intellectual
property, especially trademarks. 6' And the Consumer Protection Act of
1979 provides for a Consumer Protection Agency to enforce its provisions.
These laws are primarily enforced by other government agencies. Yet, in
regards to consumer protection, the KFTC has exhibited its strong
commitment to aggressively protect consumer interests, which is expected
to become one of the central pillars of the KFTC's enforcement activities in
the near future.
Importantly, the KFTC administers several companion statutes
governing specific areas of antitrust concern. The KFTC devotes significant
resources to administering these laws, so it is worth looking more closely at
how they are enforced.
1. Companion Statutes
First, the Fair Subcontract Transactions Act aims to establish fair
subcontracting practices and create a competitive environment for small and
medium-sized subcontractors. It prohibits large companies from unduly
reducing payments to subcontractors, bans them from refusing to accept
returned goods, and requires them to pay their subcontractors within 60
days, with interest to be paid after this set period.62 The act also contains
other regulations to protect subcontractors from unfair actions by large
companies during the transaction process. In recognition of the growing
59 Id. at 68-70; KFTC; supra note 3, at 39-40.
60 Id. at 78-83.
61 The act has been revised several times. It was renamed the Unfair Competition
Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act in 1998.6 2 KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET
ORIENTED ECONOMY 46-52 (2001).
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importance of the service sector in subcontracts between large companies
and small-and-medium sized subcontractors, the KFTC recently amended
the law to encompass service subcontractors.63
Second, the Adhesion Contract Act aims to eliminate biased
contracts, written and circulated by businesses, which preclude the
consumer's right to choose the terms of a transaction. It requires businesses
to issue formal contracts and explain their terms to consumers, and
invalidates clauses that unduly infringe on consumers' rights.
64
Third, the Fair Labeling and Advertising Act aims to ensure that
consumers are given accurate information that enables them to make
informed choices. It requires firms to withdraw and correct false
representations and misleading advertising and to disclose all information
that could be considered relevant to consumer decision-making. In addition,
firms may be ordered to hand over evidentiary material.65
Fourth, the Door-to-Door Sales Act aims to protect consumers and
secure a smooth flow of goods and services in the trouble-prone area of
door-to-door sales and pyramid selling schemes. 66 It requires pyramid
businesses to purchase consumer compensation insurance or subscribe to a
cooperative, to educate their sales force on illegal sales activities, and to
allow buyers of their products to withdraw unconditionally from contracts
within fourteen days of purchase.67
Fifth, the Installment Transactions Act recognizes the consumer's right
to withdraw from a contract within seven days of purchasing a product on
an installment plan. It requires businesses to give consumers advance notice
of fourteen days or more when a contract is being terminated due to
consumer default. It also invalidates contract clauses that unfairly
disadvantage consumers.
68
Sixth, the Fair Franchise Transactions Act aims to establish a fair trade
system for franchise businesses and ensure the mutually beneficial and
balanced development of franchisers and franchisees. The law bans various
kinds of unfair transactions in franchise operations and defines the basic
rules governing the relationship between franchiser and franchisee. It
requires franchisers to provide up-to-date and correct information to their
franchisees, bans the use of false or exaggerated information, obligates the
parties to a franchise to return franchise fees under certain conditions, and
sets rules for the issuance of franchise contracts.69
63 Fair Subcontract Transactions Act, No. 3799 (1984) (S. Korea).
64 Adhesion Contract Act, No. 3922 (1986) (S. Korea).
65 Fair Labeling and Advertising Act, No. 5814 (1999) (S. Korea).
66 Door-to-Door Sales, Etc. Act, No. 5086 (1995) (S. Korea).
67 id.
68 Installment Transactions Act, No. 4480 (1991) (S. Korea).
69 Fair Franchise Transactions Act, No. 6704 (2002) (S. Korea).
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Finally, the Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce Act aims to
protect vulnerable consumers in electronic commerce due to its very nature:
with no face-to-face transactions, it is often difficult to locate the seller as
well as to physically examine the product before purchase. This law
protects consumer interests and enhances market reliability in this sector.
To this end, it establishes safety measures or mechanisms for the following:
preventing consumer error while using electronic devices, protection of
consumer information from possible abuse, adoption of an unconditional
seven day contract withdrawal period, and the mandatory purchase of a
consumer compensation insurance policy by e-money issuers.7°
2. The Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act
In February 1999, the KFTC promulgated a special law to deal with
pervasive cartel behaviors permitted, or in some instances encouraged, by
statutes administered by other government agencies. This law, the Omnibus
Cartel Repeal Act ("Cartel Act"),7 1 was drawn up to conform to the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development's ("OECD")
1998 recommendations on hard-core cartels.72 It abolished the formation of
cartels by eight categories of certified professionals, including lawyers,
accountants, customs officers, patent lawyers, architects, and veterinarians.
Moreover, the Cartel Act revised the collective optional contract system for
SME products, which previously allowed collusive behavior by SMEs in
government purchasing programs. In all, the Cartel Act revised around
twenty regulations that, until that time, impeded market competition. The
passage of this legislation indicated that the KFTC formally began to
exercise its competition advocacy role in Korea.73
A KFTC study shows that professional fees and commissions have
remained the same or decreased since the implementation of the Cartel
Act. 7  After abrogation of the prevailing compensation standard, price
competition started to take effect and, in time, the professions reached a
new, more appropriate price level. The Consumer Protection Agency has
tried to ensure that consumers have access to the information they need to
determine appropriate fee levels for professional services and select the
services that best meet their needs.75
In addition, the differential between professional fees for similar tasks
70 KFTC, supra note 3, at 466-69.
71 Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act, No. 5815 (1999).
72 OECD 1998 Recommendation on Hard-Core Cartels, http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/
ites/0299/ijee/oecd.htm (last visited April 15, 2006).
73 KFTC Press Release, supra note 1.
74 Press Release, KFTC, Investigation Results on Fees of 8 Licensed Professionals (Feb.
7, 2005) (on file with author).751 d. at 8-18.
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has lessened, with a tendency for fees to level out at the lower end of the
spectrum.76 Nevertheless, this differential can still be very large, ranging
from 3.3 to 50 times the highest price charged to the lowest price charged."
Not only has increasing price competition resulted in an overall decrease in
fees, but fees have tended to converge at the average price due to increases
in the lowest fees and decreases in the highest, as illustrated in Table 2.
Attorneys' fees are the exception, where prices for the most expensive
services have gone up, increasing the gap between the lowest and highest
fees charged for similar tasks: the highest fees were between 14.5 and 30
times greater than the lowest fees charged in 2001 .78
As one might expect, professional fees for similar services differ
according to location. This indicates that prices are formed naturally
through supply and demand. The Seoul region, where demand for
professional services is greatest, records the highest prices. This is also
where the most highly paid professionals are found. Moreover, the
difference between the highest and lowest fees charged for similar tasks is
greatest in Seoul.
C. Monopoly Regulations and Fair Trade Act
1. Curbing Concentration of Economic Power
a. Limitation on Total Investment
One of the means employed by the MRFTA to curb undue
concentration of economic power is the so-called limitation on total
investment amounts. The threshold for applying the limitation on total
investment amount is six trillion Korean won in assets, calculated by adding
up all of the assets of companies belonging to any business group.79
Therefore, a company belonging to a business group with combined
assets of at least six trillion Korean won and thus subject to the limitation
on total investment amount, may not acquire or hold stock of other
domestic companies in excess of 25% of the company's net asset amount.80
Stock of overseas companies and treasury stock do not count toward the
total investment amount.
81
The net asset amount of a company, for the purposes of this limitation,
is equal to the larger of (1) the capital, or (2) the equity (or paid-in) capital,
76 Id. at 10.
17 Id. at 13-14.
78 Id. at 4, 14.
79 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 238.
80 KFTC, supra note 3, at 311.
81 MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 10 (1), (6).
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less the amount of any equity investment in that company held by its
affiliates (valued at par). The stock of other domestic companies held by
a company subject to the limitation is valued at acquisition cost. However,
the limitation does not apply to some categories of companies. Most
notably, it does not apply to a "holding company." Additionally, the
limitation does not apply to (1) a financial or insurance company, (2) a
company under insolvency, restructuring, or similar proceedings, or (3) a
company belonging to any business group whose debt-to-equity ratio (i.e.,
the ratio of debt to total assets less liabilities) is less than 100% as shown on
the consolidated financial statement.
83
Where a company is subject to the limitation, certain of its investments
do not count toward the total investment limit. These include those
investments in (1) another company in the same industrial or business
sector or whose business operations are closely related to those of the
investing company, (2) a qualified "social overhead capital" company, (3) a
company in which any governmental unit holds at least 30% of the stock, or
(4) a government-held company being privatized.84 In addition, certain
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by the limitation are
permitted for a limited duration within which any violation of the limitation
must be cured.
b. Restrictions on the Exercise of Voting Rights by Financial or Insurance
Companies
In general, a financial or insurance company belonging to a business
group with at least two trillion Korean won in assets may not exercise
voting powers based on any shares of stock it holds in a domestic affiliate
or another domestic company belonging to the same business group.85
However, certain exceptions do apply. The fundamental policy behind this
provision is that financial capital should be separated from industrial
capital.
A financial or insurance company may exercise voting rights based on
the shares it holds for the purpose of carrying on the financial or insurance
business. An insurance company may exercise voting rights based on the
shares it holds for the purpose of the efficient operation and management of
the insurance assets and with approval under the Insurance Business Act or
other laws. Also, a financial or insurance company may exercise voting
rights based on the shares it holds in a listed or registered domestic affiliate
(i.e., an affiliate listed with the Korea Stock Exchange or registered with
82 KFTC, supra note 3, at 309, n.16.
83 Id. at 176-77, 309; MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 10 (7).
84 KFTC, supra note 3, at 177, 309; MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 10 (6).
85 KFTC, supra note 3, at 347-48.
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Kosdaq) if the agenda is the appointment or dismissal of a director or
officer, an amendment of the articles of incorporation, or a merger or
transfer of the whole or a substantial part of the business. However, if the
sum of such shares and the shares in the same affiliate held by that
affiliate's specially related party exceed 15% of all the issued and
outstanding shares of that affiliate, the financial or insurance company may
not exercise voting rights based on shares equal in number to such excess
(however, according to interim measures, this may progressively exceed
30% by March 31, 2006, 25% by March 31, 2007, 20% by March 31, 2008,
and 15% from April 1, 2008).86 As a note, some of Samsung's financial
affiliates filed a suit with Korea's Constitutional Court to invalidate this
provision on the grounds that the gradual reduction of the shares until 2008
abridges their property rights and equal treatment bestowed by Korea's
Constitution.
c. Holding Companies
To be a "holding company," a company must satisfy two conditions:
(1) have at least one hundred billion Korean won in assets, and (2) the value
of the shares it holds in its subsidiaries must account for at least 50% of the
value of its assets.87
The establishment of a holding company, or the conversion of a pre-
existing company into a holding company, must be reported to KFTC
within certain prescribed time limits: thirty days after establishment or
conversion as a result of a merger or spin-off; and four months after the end
of the fiscal year in which a company became a holding company as a result
of acquisition of shares in other companies or other increases or decreases
in assets.88
Although a holding company may hold shares in its subsidiaries
beyond the limitation on gross investment amount (as described above), it is
subject to certain other restrictions. A holding company may not have a
debt-to-equity ratio exceeding 100%.89 However, if a company becomes a
holding company as a result of an in-kind contribution, or becomes a
holding company or is newly created as such as a result of a merger or spin-
off (hereinafter, "the event of a conversion or new establishment"), then
there is a cure period of two years.90
Moreover, a holding company may not hold less than a certain
minimum equity interest in a subsidiary (30% of the total issued and
86 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 261-63.
87 MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 2(1)-(2).
88 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 267.
89 Id. at 268.
90 Id.
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outstanding shares of a subsidiary if a listed or registered company, 20% if
the subsidiary is a so-called venture company, and 50% in all other cases). 91
However, a cure period of two years applies in the event of a conversion or
new establishment.
92
A holding company may have as subsidiaries only financial or
insurance companies or only companies that are not financial or insurance
companies.93 In other words, a holding company may not have both kinds
of subsidiaries. This represents Korea's strict separation of industrial and
financial capital. In addition, a holding company may not have a second-
tier subsidiary.94 In other words, a subsidiary of a holding company may
not itself have a subsidiary. However, a second-tier subsidiary is permitted
if a close relationship exists between the first-tier subsidiary and the
second-tier subsidiary, such as that of a parts or service provider.
d. "Roadmap" and Proposed Amendments to the MRFTA
On December 30, 2003, the KFTC announced The Three Year Market
Reform Roadmap. 95 This reform aimed at improving the internal and
external monitoring system of companies and business groups by enhancing
transparency, fairness and competition in market transactions.
96
The measures that the government introduced towards this end can be
divided into three categories: (1) measures to strengthen transparency and
accountable business management, (2) measures to improve corporate
ownership and governance structure of large business conglomerates, and
(3) measures to enhance market competition.
First, the program to strengthen transparency and accountable business
management included new legislation introducing securities related class
action law suits in Korea (passed in 2003), amending audit-related laws
(passed in 2003), permitting electronic voting at shareholders meeting, and
further separating industrial and financial capital. For example, the
legislation further limited the exercise of voting power by a financial or
insurance company belonging to a business group with at least two trillion
Korean won in assets (as described above).97
Next, the program to improve the corporate ownership and governance
structure of large business conglomerates included an expansion of
disclosure requirements applicable to such conglomerates, a fine-tuning of
the limitation on the total investment amount by which certain companies
91 KFTC, supra note 3, at 181.
92 Id.
93 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 279.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 251.
96 id.
97 Id. at 251-56, 261-64.
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may be exempted from such limitations, and encouragement for business
groups to adopt a holding company structure. According to the MRFTA as
amended on Dec. 31, 2004, companies falling under one of four categories
were exempt from the regulations governing the total investment amount:
(1) companies with good corporate governance programs and armed with
effective internal monitoring systems, such as a cumulative voting system
and vote-by-mail system, as well an internal transaction review committee
consisting only of outside directors; (2) companies that adopt a holding
company structure; (3) companies engaged in relatively uncomplicated
cross-shareholdings with fewer than five affiliates; and (4) companies with
a relatively small gap between the voting rights and cash flow rights of the
controlling shareholder. 98 As part of efforts to further separate industrial
from financial capital, the 30% threshold described above is scheduled to be
gradually reduced by 5% per year and ultimately to 15% by 2008. 99
Finally, as part of the program to enhance market competition, the
KFTC intends to streamline and improve the anti-competitive regulation
regime, anti-cartel measures, and the KFTC's M&A review system, as well
as introduce more self-regulatory mechanisms.
2. Business Combinations
a. Overview
The MRFTA prohibits a business combination that substantially
restricts competition in its relevant market and grants the KFTC authority to
issue a corrective order to an enterprise in violation of, or likely to violate,
such regulation.100 In order to secure effective administration, the MRFTA
requires a report to be filed with the KFTC when a business combination
meets certain requirements.101 Because transnational M&A activities are
increasingly affecting the domestic market, the KFTC also introduced (in
2003) a notification threshold for M&As between foreign companies.10 2
Recently, the KFTC attempted to strengthen its investigative powers
with regards to business combinations, which became an issue of interest to
enterprises in Korea. As a representative case, in September 2004 the
KFTC prevented SAMICK Musical Instrument Co., Ltd. ("SAMICK"), an
enterprise holding approximately a 35% share of the Korean piano market,
9' Id. at 253-54.
9 Id. at 261-63.
100 KFTC, supra note 3, at 175.
101 Id.
102 Yong Seok AIm & Youngjin Jung, Merger Control in Korea, ASIA PAC. ANTITRUST
REV. 62, 64(2004), available at http://www.lawleeko.com/pdf/ArticleYSA_1.pdf. In fact,
one foreign company has already reportedly been fined for failing to make such a
notification to the KFTC. Id.
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from purchasing Young Chang Co., Ltd. ("Young Chang"), an enterprise
holding an approximately 60% share of the Korean piano market. 3 The
KFTC reasoned that since the market share of the combined companies
would reach up to 92% and result in a defacto monopoly, it was likely that
there would be an abuse of market power and subsequent damage to
consumer interests. 104 Some commentators hurled criticism against this
decision, arguing that under the current market conditions for piano makers,
taking into consideration that competition in the world market is
competitive, permitting the business combination of two companies, each of
which have weak competition powers as compared to foreign companies,
cannot be deemed to restrict competition.10 5 Moreover, should the business
combination of the two companies not be approved, the companies would
find it difficult to survive since they would not be able to secure
competitive power. The case went to court and its outcome is currently
pending.
The first case in which the KFTC determined that conglomerate
integration would restrict competition involved the acquisition of Jinro Co.,
Ltd, a soju (Korean wine) manufacturer, by Hite Co., Ltd., a beer
manufacturer. 116 The main issues in the case were: (i) whether soju and
beer were substitutable products; and (ii) whether there would be an anti-
competitive effect due to the fact that the two products utilized the same
distribution channel (i.e., liquor wholesalers). On the first issue, the KFTC
found that soju and beer were not in the same product market. However, on
the issue of the anti-competitive effect of the contemplated transaction, the
KFTC concluded that the combination of the two dominant companies
would greatly restrict potential competition because the conglomerate
companies may abuse their dominant power in downstream sales to
consumers as well as in upstream wholesale markets. While approving the
transaction, the KFTC adopted the following corrective measures to address
the potential anti-competitive effect which, among others, included (i) an
order barring Hite from raising the retail price of soju and beer beyond the
consumer price inflation rate over the next five years, and instructing Hite
to consult with the KFTC in advance should it wish to raise their prices, and
(ii) an order to separately manage the two companies' sales divisions for the
next five years. 10
103 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 130-32.
104 Id.
'0' OECD, Barriers to Entry 154 (paper prepared by the Directorate for Financial and
Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/
9/36344429.pdf.106Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Hite-Jinro Merger Gets Behavioral
Remedy from the KFTC (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/.
107 Id.
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Until now, there have only been a few cases wherein the KFTC had
conducted economic analyses in the course of its proceedings relating to
business combination investigations. However, increasingly economic
analysis has been conducted in important business combinations. In the
case of Jinro, a very sophisticated economic analysis used previously in the
Microsoft case was used to analyze the relationship between the soju and
beer markets. The latest KFTC reorganization established a Division for
Economic Analysis within the existing KFTC structure.10 8
b. Reporting Requirements
Under the MRFTA, if a company has aggregate assets or turnover
(including the assets or turnover of all of its affiliated companies and
related persons worldwide) of one hundred billion Korean won
(approximately US $90 million) or more, then the company should file a
business combination report with the KFTC. 0 9
Unlike in the United States and the European Union, the MRFTA
specifies five types of business combinations subject to merger filing. The
first type is an acquisition of shares by a company (either directly or
through an affiliate or other party with which it has a special relationship)
of 20% or more of the total issued and outstanding shares of another
company whose stock is not listed with the Korea Stock Exchange (it must
have 15% or more if the stock is listed with the Korea Stock Exchange).
The second is a merger between two companies. The third type is a
business transfer in the form of acquisition by a company (whether by
transfer, lease, or the entrustment of the management) of the whole or a
substantial portion of the business undertaking of another company.
Fourth, the combination creates an interlocking directorate (the concurrent
holding of a director or officer's position in another company by a director
or employee of a company, with the term "officer," as defined in MRFTA,
embracing representative directors (the Korean equivalent of a CEO),
directors, statutory auditors, unlimited liability partners, and certain high-
level managers). The last type is a subscription by a company for at least
20% of the total issued shares of a new company. 1o
c. Timing of Reporting Requirements
Normally, a reporting company should file its Report with the KFTC
within thirty days of the date of the consummation of the pertinent
transaction. Thus, in these cases, the KFTC will review the Business
108 Republic of Korea Fair Trade Commission, KFTC News (2005), available at
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/kftc-news(2005_december).doc.
109 Ahn & Jung, supra note 102.
110 Id.
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Combination after its occurrence ("post-merger filing").
However, if the company has aggregate assets or turnover (including the
assets or turnovers of all affiliated companies and related persons worldwide)
of 2 trillion Korean won (approximately US $1.8 billion) or more (a "Large
Company"), then it should file its Report before the completion of the
transaction in all types of Business Combinations except in cases of an
interlocking directorate.11 The KFTC, at its discretion, may extend the thirty
day standstill period by a maximum of ninety days or, conversely, may
shorten the standstill period.' 1 2 During this period, the KFTC should examine
the contemplated transaction to ascertain whether such a transaction would
contravene the MRFTA.
d. Standards of Review
Following the filing of a Report, the KFTC will then examine the
report, along with other pertinent information, to determine whether the
Business Combination in question would substantially impair competition
in the relevant market. If the KFTC finds that the Business Combination
would substantially restrain competition, then the transaction would be
prohibited under the MRFTA unless such anti-competitive Business
Combination falls within one of two exceptions: (i) the enhancement of
efficiency related to such Business Combination outweighs the
anticompetitive effect, or (ii) such Business Combination is necessary for
the revitalization of a financially distressed company. The former
exception is the Korean law equivalent of the concept of "merger-specific
efficiency" and the latter exception is comparable to the concept of the
"failing company doctrine" found in the antitrust laws of the United States.
According to the KFTC's horizontal merger section in its Business
Combinations Examination Guidelines, a Business Combination may be
regarded as having anticompetitive effects if (i) the aggregate market share
of the combining companies in the relevant market is 50% or greater, or (ii)
the aggregate market share of the top three companies, including the
combining companies, in the relevant market is 70% or greater.1 13
3. Cartels
a. Overview
The MRFTA prevents, as an undue or unfair concerted act, an
enterprise from agreeing to restrict, among other things, the price of goods
or services, transaction volume, or transaction conditions, together with
111 Id.
112 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 18.
113 Ahn & Jung, supra note 102.
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other enterprises by way of contract, agreement, resolution, etc. Since
cartels hinder fair competition and harm consumers, the KFTC conducts
efforts to efficiently regulate cartels. However, proving that there is an
agreement to create a cartel is difficult because most cartels generally
conduct their activities in secret.
Until 1993, the MRFTA required that a concerted act be performed in
order to support the finding of cartel activity. 14 However, since then the
MRFTA has been amended to the effect that even absent the performance
of a concerted act, but with an agreement thereon, such actions may violate
the MRFTA. Moreover, the MRFTA has a unique provision that would
facilitate cartel investigation. Article 19:5 of the MRFTA provides for the
presumption that although a direct agreement is not found, if parallel
behaviors are ascertained in the market, the existence of such agreements
may be presumed. 115 A great deal of controversy has arisen over this
provision, in particular concerning whether it obviates the need to
investigate "plus factors" in cases of "conscious parallelism,"' 1 6 that is, the
synchronous action that is the product of a rational, independent calculus by
each member of the oligopoly, as opposed to collusion." 7 Recently the
Korean Supreme Court confirmed that it is not necessary to show a "plus
factor" in interpreting the presumption provision on collusive behavior.
This could be viewed as at least a technical victory for the KFTC in cartel
enforcement. " 8
Recently, the KFTC has expended greater resources on the regulation
of international cartels. For the first time, in 2002 the KFTC applied the
MRFTA extraterritorially. It imposed a $9.2 million surcharge on an
international cartel in graphite electrodes, a decision that was later upheld
by the Seoul High Court. Thereafter, in 2003, the KFTC imposed a $3.3
million surcharge on foreign companies involved in an international vitamin
cartel. 119 These cases are discussed in more detail in Section IV below.
As the KFTC strengthens its investigation of cartels, the KFTC's
relationship with other governmental authorities and legal systems has
114 KFTC, supra note 3, at 89-90.
115 "Where two or more enterprises are committing any act listed in subparagraphs of
paragraph (1) that practically restrict competition in a particular business area, they shall be
presumed to have committed unfair collaborative act despite the absence of an explicit
agreement to engage in such acts." MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 19(5).
116 ANDREW I. GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 255-56 (2002).
117 Williamson Oil Co. vs Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1299 (1 th Cir. 2003).
118 In re Dongsuh Food Co., 99Du6514, 99Du6521 (Consolidated), available at
http://www.scourt.go.kr/scourt en/crtdcsns/crtdcsns2/1173896_1190.html.
119 Korea Fair Trade Commission, The Relationship Between Growth-centered Industrial
Policy and Competition Policy (June 7, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/
wto200103.htm. [hereinafter KFTC Relationship Paper].
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become a concern. Although many regulations have been abolished as
compared to in the past, Korea still maintains special regulations in
connection with pricing and supply which are applicable to particular
industries, such as telecommunications and energy. That is, the policies of
the administrative departments that supervise the relevant industrial areas
have a direct or indirect influence on the management activities of the
enterprises doing business in the relevant industry. Many enterprises that
have been investigated for cartel activity by the KFTC have argued that
their acts were conducted in accordance with the regulations imposed by
their relevant industries or the guidelines of the relevant administrative
departments. However, the KFTC has adhered to its position that such
excuses cannot justify cartel activity.
For instance, in 2005 the KFTC strengthened its enforcement activities
over regulated sectors such as telecommunications and financial
industries-notably in the Korea Telecom ("KT") investigation. 120  The
case involved certain agreements reached on telephone service subscription
rates between KT, which traditionally monopolized the local Korean
telecommunications market, and Hanarotelecom, a relative newcomer to the
market. 121 Specifically, just prior to the launching of the "local phone
number transferability service" in 2003, KT and Hanarotelecom reached an
agreement to reduce the difference in the two companies' service
subscription rates. As a result of the price collusion charges, the KFTC
imposed administrative fines on both KT and Hanarotelecom.
Hanarotelecom sought refuge under the KFTC's Leniency Program and
obtained a 49% reduction in the amount of the administrative fine originally
imposed upon it.
122
b. Leniency
The amended MRFTA (effective as of April 1, 2005), and the
enforcement decree promulgated thereunder, introduced major changes to
the leniency program that applied to collusive behavior. The enforcement
decree under the amended act provides for an "automatic" leniency policy
for the first individual to report a cartel to the KFTC. 123 The informant will
be subject to neither an administrative fine nor any corrective measures
usually imposed by the KFTC if (i) the informant is the first and sole
provider of evidence necessary to prove the existence of the cartel, (ii) the
120 Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Corrective Orders & Surcharges
Imposed on Telecom Operations in Fixing Prices, (Oct. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/.
121 id.
122 Id.
123 Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (No. 17564), art.
35, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 18768, March 31, 2005.
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KFTC has received no previous information or proof regarding the cartel,
(iii) the informant provides a full report and cooperates fully with the KFTC
throughout its investigation, and (iv) the informant has ended its
involvement in the illegal activity. Therefore, the first-in informant
receives complete amnesty from administrative penalty and probable
amnesty from criminal penalty, similar to the U.S. leniency program.
Unlike the U.S. leniency program and more in line with the EU
leniency program, a second individual who reports to the KFTC before its
investigation has commenced will also receive a reduction in fines and
more lenient corrective measures. This informant must be the second sole
provider of evidence necessary to prove the existence of a cartel and must
meet the two latter requirements mentioned above.
The amended decree abolishes the requirement that an informant must
not be the ringleader or originator of the activity in question, and must not
have coerced another party into participating in the activity (a situation for
which verification was considered difficult under the previous decree).
"Amnesty plus" is a new feature under the amended decree, whereby an
entity that cooperates in a cartel investigation reveals a company's
involvement in a second cartel in a different product/service market; in so
doing, such informant becomes eligible for additional reductions in (or
exemption from) fines otherwise applicable with respect to the first
investigation.
1 25
D. Competition Policy in Practice
1. The Functions of the KFTC
The KFTC is the principal governmental agency in charge of enforcing
the MRFTA. It operates at a ministerial level under the umbrella of the
Prime Minister and functions as a quasi-judicial body. The KFTC consists
of a committee made up of nine members (the decision-making body) and a
secretariat (the working body). It has more than 400 employees and a
budget of over 250 million Korean Won, as shown in Table 3. The role of
the courts in enforcing competition law in Korea is relatively limited
because the system of private lawsuits does not allow for treble damages,
class actions, and effective pre-trial discovery processes, as in the United
States. Administrative proceedings conducted by the KFTC therefore play
a central role in the enforcement of the act.
About 80-90% of the tasks performed by the KFTC are traditional
cartel regulation, business combination reviews, regulation of abuse of
124 Id.
125 See KFTC, supra note 3, at 52-57.
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market dominance, and monitoring of unfair trade practices. 126 In addition,
as mentioned earlier, the KFTC pursues policies dealing with economic
concentration. The regulations set out in Chapter 3 of the MRFTA differ
from traditional competition law in that they apply without regard to the
concept of a relevant market-the cardinal element of competition policy in
most jurisdictions. The philosophy that financial capital must be kept
separate from industrial capital in order to prevent the chaebol from
dominating the national economy is also reflected in the provisions of the
MRFTA."'
Apart from its unique authority to deal with general concentration of
ownership, the KFTC is endowed with the capability to conduct
competition advocacy among other government agencies. 128 As a
competition advocate, it seeks to prevent laws and regulations that would
restrict competition from being enacted and to remove existing regulations
that impede competition. It does this by consulting with other government
agencies to identify anti-competitive regulations and suggesting possible
remedies to the Regulatory Reform Committee in the Prime Minister's
Office. 129 In 2000, the KFTC considered 481 cases of legislation brought to
it for prior consultation. 130 The agency is also consulted on matters relating
to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, where its job is to design
measures to facilitate competition during the privatization process, so that
public monopolies are not simply transformed into private monopolies.13
1
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that concerns may
legitimately be raised about the conflict between the KFTC's extensive
powers-over the chaebol in particular-and its traditional antitrust
mandate, which would normally require it to pursue an efficiency
maximization policy. Although there is a need to restrain the chaebol from
abusing market-dominant positions in certain markets, it is difficult to
justify a strict anti-chaebol policy, which might decrease consumer welfare.
This is a more important consideration in light of the present global
economy, where the chaebol themselves face strong competition from
foreign companies that are not bound by the same disciplines.
2. Enforcement of Competition Law
As mentioned, private lawsuits based on MRFTA provisions are rare
because aggrieved individuals could only file a suit in court after the
corrective measures imposed by the KFTC have been finalized. Individuals
126 SUNG & SHIN, supra note 35, at 6.
127 Lee, supra note 38, at 69-70.
128 Id. at 72.
129 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 496.
130 id.
131 KFTC, supra note 3, at 187-90.
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could conceivably lodge a tort claim under the Civil Code, but due to the
difficulty of gathering evidence, this would be a rare occurrence. The
prosecutor's office also plays a very limited role in enforcing the MRFTA
because, in most cases, it can prosecute offenders only if the KFTC has
referred the matter to it. It is therefore safe to say that the KFTC plays the
dominant role in enforcing the MRFTA. In this sense, Korea's competition
regime is closer to the European system than to the American system:
Europe administrative agencies play a central role in enforcement whereas
in the United States, multiple actors are involved in the enforcement of
antitrust law. Moreover, the courts have a much greater role to play in the
United States than in Korea.
To enhance the role of individuals in the enforcement of the antitrust
law, a new legislative bill was introduced early this year to allow aggrieved
individuals to file damages claims with the courts without waiting for the
KFTC's corrective measure to be finalized. The government expects this
and some other, yet to be announced, improvements to the system to spur
the number of private lawsuits in Korea. While it is too soon to tell whether
such legislative changes will bring a dramatic increase in private lawsuits in
Korea, the record of private lawsuits as of now is not encouraging. On the
other hand, an increasing number of enterprises have been challenging the
corrective measures imposed on them by bringing administrative suits
before the Seoul High Court, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
administrative antitrust suits. About forty such cases have been filed
annually over the past several years.
A study of the KFTC's enforcement history reveals that it has tended
to emphasize behavioral over structural regulation. In particular, it has
expended a great deal of resources on regulating unfair trade practices to
correct imbalances in markets where the parties have an unequal position.
This interest of the KFTC can be attributed in part to the strong legacy of
the industrial policies of the 1980,s.132 During the period of 1981 to 2000,
the KFTC issued a total of 5,521 corrective notices in connection with
unfair trade practices, including cases of resale price maintenance.13 3 Most
of these involved issues of vertical restraint arising from transactions
between manufacturers, wholesale dealers, and retailers. Between 1981 and
1992, the KFTC issued only 94 corrective notices in connection with
violations of cartel regulations. However, from 1993 to 2000 it markedly
stepped up its level of enforcement, imposing as many as 238 corrective
notices in connection with collusive behavior-a coveted record even
compared with that of developed countries. With respect to merger
controls, one of the premier structural instruments, the KFTC has only a
meager record of enforcement. During the twenty years from 1981 to 2000,
132 SUNG & SHIN, supra note 35, at 3.
"' Id. at 26.
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it issued corrective measures in only twelve cases. Despite some positive
signs in recent years, out of the 600 or so corporate combination filings
recorded each year in 2001, 2002, and 2003, the KFTC has taken corrective
action only in a very small number of cases.1 34 Arguably, the primary legal
instrument to deal with Korea's entrenched monopolistic and oligopolistic
market conditions is a set of MRFTA provisions on abuse of market
dominant positions. However, cases involving the aforementioned have
been scarce.
The way market dominance is regulated in MRFTA is similar to that
of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which codifies abuses of market dominance.
It is a general understanding that with respect to abuse of market
dominance, Korea follows the European model rather than the American
model since at least the statutory language set forth in Article 3-2 of the
MRFTA does not regulate an enterprise with a dominant market power
unless the enterprise abuses its dominance.'3 5 As showcased in the latest
Microsoft case, the KFTC puts great emphasis on regulating abuse of a
market dominant position, especially in "new economy" industries as
opposed to smoke-stack industry. 136 In 1996 the KFTC was given a new
enforcement power that allowed it to initiate actions to promote competition
in markets in which monopolies or oligopolies have existed for an extended
period of time.33 This new initiative, which has the flavor of a "general"
structural remedy, has fared well. 138 The KFTC has conducted a series of
thorough investigations into areas where an egregious monopolistic or
oligopolistic market had existed for a lengthy period of time-such as
automobiles, tires, steel, and beer-and has taken the action necessary to
remedy the situation. 13
9
The KFTC has a unique set of tools to alleviate the evidentiary
difficulties in enforcing the MRFTA. The three so-called "statutory
presumption" provisions apply in the context of identifying market-
dominant enterprises, determining substantial restraint of competition
resulting from mergers, and identifying collusive behavior that restrains
competition. Another of the extraordinary powers of the KFTC concerns
134 Ahn & Jung, supra note 102.
135 In practice, even U.S. antitrust law does not condemn a monopoly per se. Despite the
language of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the judicial gloss on the section indicates that for
there to be a violation of the said Section, a company must not only possess monopoly
power, but should also commit a certain exclusionary act. See U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
136 KFTC Press Release, supra note 1.
137 KFTC, supra note 3, at 161.
138 Id. at 9-10.
139 OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Korea 12 (1999),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/50/2405359.pdf.
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the collection of evidence from financial institutions. 40 To facilitate the
investigation of internal transactions among chaebol affiliates with respect
to funds, assets, and personnel, for a limited duration the KFTC has the
power to ask their financial institutions to provide relevant financial
information. 141
Finally, it would be remiss not to stress the importance of
administrative surcharges in ensuring compliance with the law. Surcharges
are being imposed in an increasing number of cases of anti-competitive
behavior, and the ceiling on these surcharges is rising. 42 Moreover, the
KFTC is able to impose administrative surcharges without resorting to the
courts. 143 This unique enforcement tool is considered very effective, mostly
due to the size of the surcharges: from April 2005, companies taking part in
cartels may be subject to surcharges amounting to as much as 10% their
total sales volume. 14 4 Although strong and effective as an enforcement tool,
the surcharge system also faces criticism because of the KFTC's overly
wide discretion in setting the amount of the surcharges.
All countries maintain articles of law that partially or entirely exempt
certain sectors from the application of competition law. Common examples
are utility industries such as telecommunications and electricity, which are
often government-owned or regulated in the belief that they have natural
monopolistic aspects. In Korea, the range of such exemptions is gradually
being reduced, as regulatory and technological developments in areas where
corporations had previouslY enjoyed a monopoly position have increased
the scope of competition. Recently, the KFTC has attached special
emphasis to combatting monopolistic and oligopolistic structures in markets
where public enterprises are dominant. 
146
3. Market Concentration
In general, the liberalization policy undertaken since 1980 has not
significantly improved Korea's market concentration ratios. 147 In the midst
of the financial crisis of 1997-98, market concentration increased, but since
1999 the general, industrial, and market concentration ratios have again
declined, as shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Despite the overall fall in
concentration in the mining and manufacturing sectors, which together
account for about 30 percent of GDP, concentration ratios in some other
140 MRFTA, supra note 32, at art. 50 (5).
141 id.
142 KFTC, supra note 3, at 685-95.
143 id.
144 KFTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 54, at 65-67.
145 KFTC, supra note 3, at 282-99.
146 id.
147 KFTC Relationship Paper, supra note 119.
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leading industries and products remain very high-especially when
compared with similar ratios in countries such as Japan and the United
States, as seen in Table 7.
IV. COMPETITION POLICY AS IT AFFECTS OTHER ECONOMIC
POLICIES
A. Competition Policy and Industrial Policy
Whether competition policy should prevail over industrial policy or
vice versa has been a controversial question. Mainstream economic theory
suggests that microeconomic industrial policies focusing on selected
industries are largely ineffective; countries should therefore place more
emphasis on maintaining macroeconomic stability, which will lead to
"virtuous circles of high rates of accumulation, efficient allocation [of
resources], and strong productivity growth."'' 48 A more recent study by
Marcus Noland and Howard Pack provides further evidence for this view. 1
Mainstream economic theory exhorts developing countries not to
engage in the artificial allocation of resources as they carry out selective
industrial policies that are likely to impede competition in a given field. A
series of empirical studies on Korea's HCI drive of the 1970's, for example,
concludes that the HCI policy led to distortions in the allocation of
economic resources, resulting in excess capacity in favored sectors and
contributing to inflation and the accumulation of foreign debt. I50 The
KFTC itself appears to hold the firm belief that competition principles
should be put into operation from an early stage of economic development;
it has averred that industrial policies that constrain competition will lead to
inefficient operations characterized by excessive investment in facilities and
to higher prices for consumers. 151
Not all scholars agree with this view, however. Jean-Jacques Laffont,
for instance, has argued that "it is not always the case that competition
should be encouraged in developing countries."'' 52 He reasons that:
148 WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY
105 (1993).
149 Marcus Noland & Howard Pack, Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons
from Asia (2003).
150 Yoo, supra note 7, at 34-43; Ji Hong Kim, Korean Industrial Policy in the 1970's:
The Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive (Korea Development Institute, KDI Working Paper
9015, Seoul, 1990).
151 KFTC Relationship Paper, supra note 119.
152 Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development 6-7 (Paper
prepared for Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington,
D.C., Apr 20-21, 1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/htmI/rad/abcde/laffont.pdf
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[C]ompetition is an unambiguously good thing in the first-best world
of economists. That world assumes large numbers of participants in
all markets, no public goods, no externalities, no information
asymmetries, no natural monopolies, complete markets, fully
rational economic agents, a benevolent court system to enforce
contracts, and a benevolent government providing lump sum
transfers to achieve any desirable redistribution. 53
In his view, since developing countries lack most of these conditions, they
may legitimately turn to industrial policies as a second-best solution.
These "revisionist" scholars opine that "the more competition the
better" is not always an optimal policy. 54 Ajit Singh, for example, argues
that higher rates of investment bring about greater dynamic efficiency as
opposed to static efficiency, leading to long-term gains in growth and
productivity. 55 Governments, therefore, need to concentrate their efforts
on creating a business environment that encourages investment.156 In his
view, restricting competition in the market to ensure a reasonable, as well
as stable, rate of profits is one means of making sure that firms' incentives
to invest are not dampened. 157 Referring specifically to Korea and Japan,
he argues that competition law should be subordinated to the requirements
of industrial policy. 58
Given the dearth of comprehensive empirical studies, it is difficult to
determine which of these contrasting views is correct. Indeed, it may be
absurd to make definitive judgments based on theory without looking at the
specific circumstances facing individual economies.159 Of course, nobody
knows what actually would have happened in Korea if the government had
taken a different track-for example, by adopting a strong and
comprehensive competition policy at an early stage of economic
development. Nonetheless, one lesson we can draw from the Korean
experience is that governments that adopt industrial policy tools that serve
to create monopolistic market structures in the domestic market-whether
intentionally or unintentionally-will most likely pay the price later.
153 Id. at 1.
154 LESTER G. TELSER, A THEORY OF EFFICIENT COOPERATION AND COMPETITION (1987);
Alice H. Amsden & Ajit Singh, Growth in Developing Countries: Lessons from East Asian
Countries, 38 EuR. EcON. REv. 941, 941-42 (1994).
"' Ajit Singh, Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A
Developing Country Perspective on the European Community Proposals 12-13 (Paper
presented at the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law
and Policy, Geneva, July 2-4, 2004), available at http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/
aug2003/MCP.pdf.
156 Amsden & Singh, supra note 154, at 949-50.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Singh, supra note 155, at 2-5.
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Whether any countervailing benefits can be obtained is another question
entirely, with the answer depending on many other economic variables.
Another important dimension for evaluating industrial policy in its
relationship to competition policy is the surrounding environment. From
the 1960's to the 1980's, when economic development in Korea was
accelerating, no international disciplines existed to prevent trade or
competition distortions resulting from the industrial policies of individual
countries, in particular developing countries. The reality facing developing
countries today is very different. The present WTO subsidy rules have
major implications for internal economic policy-making and provide
standards for judging the legality of certain governmental measures, in
particular industrial policy tools. Accordingly, measures that have a
distortionary effect on international trade and competition are simply illegal
and may face legal challenges from other WTO members. 160 Industrial
measures that distort the domestic market, such as subsidies, may, under
certain circumstances, be contrary to WTO rules.' 61 Given this change in
the international legal environment, countries that adopted the Korean
model for economic development would very likely violate international
rules.
Nevertheless, industrial policies are not illegal per se. It is possible to
develop a good and effective industrial policy in harmony with competition
policy, and thereby promote the national economy, without facing the risk
of violating international norms. In the age of the "new economy"-as
opposed to a smoke-stack industrial economy-innovation and knowledge-
based intellectual property issues come to the fore; concomitantly, there is
an increasing need to develop a competition policy that takes greater
account of the need for dynamic as well as static efficiency. This allows
some room for industrial policy interventions.
At least one ministry in the Korean government appears to take such a
view; the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy has sought to
formulate industrial policies that are in harmony with competition policy.
Cognizant of the limitations of the quantitative, selective industrial policies
pursued during the period of rapid industrialization, the Ministry is now
striving to put more emphasis on qualitative, R&D-focused industrial
policies. First, as already stated, the advent of the WTO system has
significantly reduced the room for industrial policy, and the provision of
financial support for specific strategic industries is now very likely to
violate WTO subsidy rules. Second, due to changes in the economic
environment, investment-driven growth strategies are not as effective as
they once were.
160 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 260-263 (2003).
161 Id.
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Economic growth rates in Korea have been declining steadily-from
7.8% in the 1980's to 6.6% in the first half of the 1990's to 6.0% in the
latter part of the decade. 162 In an attempt to halt this decline, the
government has adopted a new strategy of innovation-driven growth. The
goal is to increase total factor productivity in ten selected "new economy"
industries that possess considerable potential for growth, including digital
television and broadcasting, liquid crystal displays ("LCDs"), and artificial
intelligence. To the extent that this new policy aims to build the general
foundation for a competitive market environment by encouraging the R&D
efforts of several industries chosen according to objective criteria, it would
not necessarily conflict with competition policy or with the WTO's subsidy
rules.
The case study of the broadband internet market presented below
shows how such a policy might work in practice. The phenomenal success
of Korea's broadband internet market can be attributed to the government's
skillful blend of industrial and competition policy. This case demonstrates
that the two should not be viewed as being inherently in conflict-a good
combination of policies can be effective in accomplishing policy goals for
the national economy as a whole.
1. A Case Study of the Broadband Internet Market
In July 1998 Thrunet, currently the third-largest internet service
provider ("ISP") in terms of number of subscribers, launched Korea's first
broadband internet services. It was followed by Hanaro Telecom (the
second-largest ISP) in April 1999 and by KT (the largest ISP and former
state enterprise) in December 1999. The ISPs offer two types of broadband
internet connection: digital subscriber line ("DSL")-usually asynchronous
digital subscriber line ("ADSL")--and cable modem. ADSL uses existing
copper telephone lines or optical fiber networks, while cable modems
employ a dedicated hybrid fiber coaxial ("HFC") network.
Initially ISPs relied on HFC networks to deliver broadband internet
services, and thus the overwhelming majority of subscribers were
connected through cable modems. However, since KT entered the market
and began competing with Hanaro Telecom for the top spot in the
broadband market, ADSL use has soared. By January 2001 there were
more ADSL subscribers than cable modem subscribers. As of October
2001, 56.8% of users were connected through ADSL, 34.9% through cable
modems, and 7.8% through local area networks ("LANs"), as shown in
Table 8. This distinguishes Korea from other nations, where cable modems
and HFC networks are more common.
162 Korean Development Institute, Economic Bulletin, Potential Growth Rate of the Korean
Economy for 2003-2012 26 (May 2003), available at http://epic.kdi.re.kr/common/
download.jsp?url=/data/epic/web/ecobul/200305/&filename=lssues.pdf.
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KT provides ADSL services over existing copper telephone lines and
does not own an HFC network at all. Hanaro Telecom, on the other hand,
provides ADSL services over an optical fiber network that it laid itself, and
cable modem services mainly through an HFC network that it leases from
Powercomm. Demand from users for each type of connection is roughly
equal. Thrunet and the other ISPs mainly, or exclusively, rely on HFC
networks and cable modems.
Although some ISPs own their own HFC networks, most lease them
from Powercomm. It was a division of Korea Electric Power Corporation
until January 2001, and originally built its HFC network for use by system
operators and cable TV program providers. Approximately 60% of the
internet services provided by Korean ISPs as of March 2002 were delivered
over HFC networks leased from Powercomm, as seen in Table 9. Under its
basic telecommunications services license, however, Powercomm itself is
prevented from offering broadband internet services to end users. In
addition to Powercomm, which owns about 48,000 kilometers of the
country's HFC networks, another 100 or so local cable TV companies own
smaller HFC networks that they sometimes lease out.
The high penetration of broadband in Korea owes much to the quality
of infrastructure. The availability of HFC networks has allowed ISPs to
provide broadband internet services without having to gain access to KT's
telephone lines, with all the problems that would entail.
Even before the formation of a broadband internet market, the
government encouraged the building of high-capacity, high-speed backbone
and core networks, both within and between cities. To alleviate the cost
burden, it made low-interest loans available from 1999 to 2001. It also
provided R&D funding to companies intending to build the networks,
implemented a certification scheme for broadband facilities installed in
apartment blocks, and introduced an internet service quality evaluation
system in an attempt to improve service quality and protect users. These
industrial policy measures were supported by measures to foster
competition among ISPs. The government classified broadband internet
services as a value-added telecommunications service under the
Telecommunication Business Act, thus allowing existing providers of basic
telecommunications services to offer internet services without first having
to obtain an additional permit or license. New market entrants, meanwhile,
only had to file a simple report with the regulators. As a result of this
relaxed policy, broadband internet access became available at the
competitive price of about Korean won 30,000-43,000 ($25-$35) per
month, encouraging dial-up users to switch to broadband.
The development strategy adopted by the government can be called
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"facilities-based competition."'' 61 Unlike most other nations, where local
loop unbundling has preceded retail competition in the telecommunications
market, Korea encouraged the early providers, Thrunet and Hanaro
Telecom, to establish their own facilities, including their own local
networks. In part this was possible because Thrunet and Hanaro Telecom
were able to reinvest their profits in facilities and networks and establish a
presence in the broadband market before the arrival of the
telecommunications heavyweight, KT.
Although facilities-based competition initially stimulated broadband
penetration, it also created problems. First, basic telecommunications
service providers were denied access to KT's local networks; new entrants
such as Dreamline, Onse Telecom, Dacom, and SK Telecom could not use
Powercomm's HFC networks either. Second, ISPs have tended to
concentrate their investments in highly populated areas. When more than
one ISP has invested in the same area, this has led to an unnecessary
dissipation of capital. Third, some basic telecommunications service
providers have run into financial difficulties because of the heavy capital
requirements of network building and marketing. Fourth, although it
entered the market after Thrunet and Hanaro Telecom, KT soon occupied a
dominant position in the market because it could use its existing network to
provide broadband internet services. Its market share was approaching 50%
by the time local loop unbundling was implemented, a level that threatened
fair competition. Finally, users in non-metropolitan areas, including small-
and medium-sized cities, have been disadvantaged by a lack of high-quality
internet services because, under facilities-based competition, the cost to
ISPs of providing such services has outweighed the benefits.
To alleviate these problems and create a fair competitive environment,
the regulators introduced local loop unbundling in April 2002.164 However,
with KT dragging its heels on providing access to its copper telephone
network, this has proceeded slowly. In fact, on February 27, 2003 the
Korea Communications Commission, a sub-agency of the Ministry of
Information and Communication, fined Korean won 2 billion for refusing to
give Hanaro Telecom access to its local loop, as well as issuing a correction
order against the company.
Korea has acquired world-class broadband internet services through a
successful combination of industrial and competition policy. From the
163 Francisco J. Proenza, The Road to Broadband Development in Developing Countries
is Through Competition Drive by Wireless and VOIP (prepared for the Wireless
Communication and Development: A Global Perspective Workshop, Annenberg Research
Network on International Communication, Oct. 7-8, 2005), available at http://amic.info/
workshop05/Proenza Wireless&VoIP_50ct2005.pdf.
164 A new article on the joint utilization of subscriber lines, Article 33-6, was inserted
into the Telecommunications Business Act in January 2001. In April 2002 the Ministry of
Information and Communication finalized its local loop unbundling guidelines.
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start, the Ministry of Information and Communication aggressively pursued
industrial policy in the sector, but without stifling competition. It fostered
competition in the market by lowering entry barriers and intervening to
prevent KT from gaining too much of a competitive edge. It also adopted a
local loop unbundling strategy to address concerns about unfair
competition. The success of the government's broadband internet strategy
is apparent in the penetration ratio: according to data provided by the
Ministry of Information and Communication, in June 2001 Korea had 6.51
million broadband subscribers (13.9% of the entire population), rising to
7.26 million (15.3% of the population) by October 2001. What can we
learn from this Korean example? At an early stage of development, the
government recognized the need for fundamental infrastructure. As an
industrial policy measure, it required market entrants to install their own
facilities while helping to create the market conditions that would make this
affordable. Later, after sufficient facilities had been set up throughout
Korea, the government changed tack and began to enforce an "essential
facilities" doctrine that rested on local loop unbundling. This enabled new
entrants to secure a foothold in an established market on a competitive
basis. This demonstrates that under certain circumstances industrial policy
can function alongside competition policy to achieve an ultimate economic
policy goal, without producing undesirable side effects from a competition
policy perspective.
B. Maximizing the Benefits of Trade and FDI Reform
As an active participant in successive GATT/WTO negotiations on
trade,
[T]he Korean Government has also made efforts to liberalize trade,
especially since the 1980's. In the aftermath of the 1997-98 financial
crisis, it redoubled its efforts. The simple average bound tariff rate was
reduced from 24.4% in 1997 to 18.5% in 2000, the applied tariff rate fell
from 13.4% to 8.8%. In the context of its post-crisis agreement with the
International Monetary Network and its Uruguay Round commitments,
the Government removed quantitative restrictions on the eight
remaining items subject to balance-of-payments protection as of 1
January 2001. The import diversification system, implemented in 1978
to restrict imports from Japan (and criticized as constituting an unfair
trade practice), was abolished in June 1999. Export subsidies and
imprecise import-licensing and certification procedures that allegedly
distorted international trade have also been discarded.165
165 Asian Development Outlook 2005, Competition Policy in the Context of Regional and
Global Integration (2005), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2005/
part03O5OO.asp.
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Economic theory suggests that trade liberalization will increase
national welfare in a competitive domestic market. However, there is less
of a consensus on whether it will bring about an increase in national welfare
when the domestic market is not competitive. In the Korean example,
where the domestic market is not always large enough to realize
economies of scale, and where various trade protection measures have
distorted the market and prevented domestic companies from operating
in an efficient manner, trade liberalization is likely to have a
"rationalization effect" by making inefficient firms exit.'6 6
The remaining firms would then be more likely to benefit from
economies of scale. Trade liberalization does not automatically lead to a
more competitive domestic market, however, and the best outcomes are
achieved when liberalization is accompanied by measures to increase
competition in the domestic market.
As with trade, the government gradually liberalized investment in
services in the 1980's and early 1990's and then instituted sweeping
liberalization measures in the aftermath of the financial crisis. It eliminated
ceilings on foreign equity ownership in the stock market, relaxed the rules
on cross-border mergers and acquistions, and fully liberalized foreign land
ownership. Foreign direct investment ("FDI") increased by 69% between
1997 and 1998, and then more than doubled to over $10 billion in 1999.167
Inflows continued to increase in 2000 on a notifications basis, while
decreasing slightly on an arrivals basis.'
168
The benefits of FDI are well established in the literature on trade
liberalization. 169 Not only does FDI induce stable, long-term inflows of
capital, it also leads to spillovers of technology and managerial know-how,
employment creation, and regional development. According to Dunning,
the presence of foreign multinationals has a positive impact on labor
productivity, largely through increased competition. 17 However, FDI is not
necessarily conducive to market competition; big players like the chaebol
"might hamper the sound development of [a] competitive market economy
by distorting or manipulating the course of liberalization, deregulation, or
opening up." 71 This is yet another reason why it is important to develop a
166 Id.
167 Mikyung Yun & Sungmi Lee, Impact of FDI on Competition: The Korean Experience
1-3 (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Working Paper No. 01-04, 2001),
available at http://www.eaber.org/intranet/documents/55/46/KIEP-Yun-0 .pdf.
168 Id. at 3.
169 Id. at 7.
170 JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AMD THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 4
(1993).
171 Keun Lee, Business Groups as an Organizational Device for Economic Catch-up 2
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competitive market in tandem with market liberalization.
Economic liberalization, if carried out correctly, is supposed to
establish a competitive market in which financial instruments, such as
shares and corporate bonds, are transacted in an open, rules-based manner.
But, in an economy where a few players dominate the market for corporate
control such that they are able to influence transactions in corporate
finance, the course that economic liberalization actually takes may differ
from what its advocates had in mind.
V. CONCLUSION
Competition law does not operate in a vacuum. It is inextricably
intertwined with the political, social, economic and cultural surroundings in
which it operates. Korea's competition law is no exception. To break the
vicious circle of economic failure that existed up until the early 1960's, the
Korean government has aggressively pursued an intensive growth strategy
throughout the 1960's and 1970's. In doing so, it has relied heavily on
industrial policy while virtually disregarding the notion of competition
policy. This strategy succeeded in recording phenomenal economic growth,
but at significant political and social costs. The advent of competition law
in 1981 was a manifestation of the Korean government's desire to address
this problem in its economic policy-making by strengthening market
competition.
Less developed countries desperate to achieve economic success may
be tempted to follow the Korean model of placing industrial policy ahead of
competition policy, at least at the initial stages of economic development.
However, as the evolution of Korea's competition policy has suggested, to
overemphasize industrial policy without regard to competition policy would
lead to considerable political and social costs in the final analysis. It would
be better for developing countries to adopt a well-planned mix of industrial
and competition policy from an early stage of economic development,
possibly using Korea's approach to the development of the broadband
intemet market as a model.
One of the most serious problems currently facing competition policy
in Korea is arguably the "excessive" regulatory power of the KFTC. The
KFTC exercises its authority to achieve multiple objectives in addition to
promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Regulating
economic concentration-a practice that is unique to Korea (and possibly
Japan)-may exemplify typical ex ante government interventions, which is
hardly consonant with the dynamics of a global economy where the chaebol
are confronted by unfettered international competition in world markets.
(July 15, 2002) (unpublished paper, School of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul)
available at http://dasan.snu.ac.kr/-ecores/activity/paper/52.pdf.
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The pursuit of broader social goals by the KFTC may lead to an inefficient
allocation of resources, which would undermine the very purpose of
competition policy. If Korea's economic circumstances and other
considerations dictate a role for the KFTC in alleviating economic
concentration, its mission in this area should be defined more clearly so as
to minimize the negative effects of pursuing such a policy.
As globalization accelerates, economic interdependence among nations
has deepened. The erosion of economic sovereignty is apparent. It is now
difficult to envision a country pursuing competition policy without regard
to international trade and investment. At present, it is commonplace for one
country's competition policy to affect the welfare of consumers in other
countries. To minimize dissonance among competition policies that have
caused friction among trading partners, tremendous efforts have been
exerted at international fora such as the ICN (International Competition
Network), the WTO, and the OECD. In the onslaught of globalization,
governments need to take full account of how their competition policies
interact with international trade and investment policies.
Given its past stellar achievements as it relates to the Korean economy
as a whole, Korea's competition law and policy will likely continue to be
reinvented to account for new challenges and to take center stage in the
development of Korea's economic infrastructure.
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TABLE 1: KOREA-STATISTICS ON CHAEBOL IN THE MINING
AND MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1985172
Share of Share of Fixed Number of
Chaebol Share of Share of Value Immovable Affiliated
Grouping Turnover (%) Employment (%) Added Assets (%) Companies
_______ _ __ _ ________(%)
Top 5 23.0 9.7 18.7 20.4 94
Top 10 30.2 11.7 24.2 27.9 147
Top 15 33.9 14.4 27.3 31.6 190
Top 20 36.4 15.5 29.5 34.4 218
Top 25 38.5 16.6 31.4 36.8 246
Top 30 40.8 17.6 33.1 39.6 270
TABLE 2: KOREA-FEES CHARGED BY CERTIFIED
PROFESSIONALS BY TYPE OF CASE, 1999-2001 (Wl0,000)
173
Fee Level (Average) Direction since
Type of Case October June December December 20002001
1 1999 2000 
2000
Contract-related
447 429 391 387 Down
cases
Tort cases 518 485 458 405 Down
Lawyers Assault cases 462 404 387 391 Up
Traffic incidents 445 485 448 378 Down
Divorce cases 411 369 350 364 Up
Audits of
individuals' 423 404 412 385 Down
financial
statements
CPA
Accounting
assessments and 118 155 131 121 Down
certifications
Cost calculations 210 264 220 157 Down
172 Source: Korea Development Institute, Analysis of Monopolistic and Oligopolistic
Market Structures (1999) (available in Korean).
173 Source: Press Release, KFTC, Investigation Results on Fees of 8 Licensed
Professionals Including Lawyers and Accountants (2001) (available in Korean).
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TABLE 3: KOREA-KFTC STAFFING AND BUDGET LEVELS, 1993-
2003 174
Staff (no. of people)' Budget (W100 million)
1993 254 64
1994 279 80
1995 341 405
1996 381 146
1997 403 184
1998 410 160
1999 402 172
2000 401 193
2001 416 220
2002 416 252
2003 416
a. Office Staff only.
TABLE 4: KOREA-GENERAL CONCENTRATION RATIO, 1981-
2001 (%a)175
1981 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Production
Top 50 36.6 30.0 33.6 34.4 37.1 38.4 38.0 38.1 36.8
companies
Top 100 46.1 37.7 40.4 41.2 44.2 45.9 45.1 44.8 43.7
companies
Hiring
Top 50 12.4 13.6 14.5 15.2 16.5 16.6 14.7 13.9 13.2
companies
Top 100 19.1 18.4 18.2 18.8 20.1 20.1 18.1 17.0 16.0
companies
a.The general concentration ratio is defined as the share of the country's 50 and 100
largest mining and manufacturing companies as a proportion of the combined mining and
manufacturing sectors, as measured by sales and employment levels.
174 Source: KFTC, White Paper on Fair Trade (2003) (available in Korean).
175 Source: KFTC, Survey of Market Structure in 2001 (Dec. 9, 2003) (available in
Korean).
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TABLE 5: KOREA-THREE-FIRM INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION RATIO, 1980-2001 (%a)176
1980 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Simple 62.4 52.8 47.8 48.6 50.0 45.4 44.0 43.4
average
CR3
Weighted 55.1 52.6 49.8 51.7 53.6 54.2 52.5 51.5
average
Simple 263.8 221.3 173.4 179.4 190.5 158.6 152.5 153.1
HHI* 1,000 avrg
Weighted 180.6 187.8 165.4 177.8 188.0 194.5 183.5 182.1
average I
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index.
a. Covers companies in the five-digit Standard
491 such companies.
Source: KFTC(2003b).
Industry Classification. In 2001, there were
TABLE 6: KOREA-THREE-FIRM MARKET CONCENTRATION
RATIO, 1980-2001 (%a)177
Year 1980 1990 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001
Simple 81.7 73.9 71.5 73.0 72.5 69.9 68.0
CR3 Average
Weighted 67.1 62.6 63.2 67.3 67.1 65.6 64.0
Average
Simple 473 393 369.7 388 389 357 331
HHI* 1,000 Average
Weighted 288 262 256.6 289 295 285 267
Average
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index.
a. Covers companies in the eight-digit Standard Industry Classification. In 2001, there were
3,056 such companies.
176 Source: Id.
177 Source: Id.
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TABLE 7: KOREA-COMPARISON WITH CONCENTRATION IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES17
Simple Average Japan Korea
1999 2000 1999 2000
CR3*100 71.6 72.0 72.5 69.9
HHI* 1,000 264.6 269.3 389.0 357.0
Simple Average United States (1997) Korea (2001)
CR4*100 42.8 48.6
HHI* 1,000 75.8 149.3
CR3 = concentration ratio of the top three firms; CR4 = concentration ratio of the top four
firms; HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index.
TABLE 8: KOREA-SIZE OF ISPS BY CONNECTION TYPE
OFFERED, OCTOBER 2001 (NO. OF SUBSCRIBERS)
179
ADSL Cable LAN B-WILL Satellite Total
modem
KT 3,068,511 - 487,956 11,532 1,018 3,569,017
Hanaro 946,871 927,487 6,435 - 28,010 1,908,803
Telecom
Thrunet 1,558 1,215,349 - - 1,216,907
Dream-line 102,244 77,912 - - 180,156
Onse - 201,490 - - 201,490
Telecom
Dacom 52,846 71,199 - 124,045
SK 57,757 - - - 57,757
Telecom
Total No. 4,119,184 2,532,841 565,590 11,532 29,028 7,258,175
% 56.8 34.9 7.8 0.2 0.4 100.0
ADSL = asynchronous digital subscriber line; LAN = local area network; B-WILL -
broadband wireless local loop a HFC networks are subsumed under ADSL or cable modem.
178 Source: Id.
179 Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
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TABLE 9: KOREA-ISPS' USE OF POWERCOMM'S HFC NETWORK,
MARCH 2002180
Thrunet Hanaro Onse Telecom Other Total
Telecom
Total number of 1,407,33 1,392,413 294,717 147,090 3,241,553
subscribers 3
Subscribers using 672,450 956,797 286,143 25,797 1,939,044
Powercomm's HFC
network (no.)
(%) 48.0 68.7 96.3 17.5 59.8
FIGURE 1: KOREA-FDI FLOWS AS A SHARE OF GDP,
1980-2003 (%a)181
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
a. FDI is in US dollars. GDP is in Korean won converted to US dollars. The high ratio
for 1999 reflects both an increase in FDI and a contraction in GDP in this year.
180 Source: Ministry of Information and Communication.
181 Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Foreign Direct
Investment Database (2004), available at http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/
ReportFolders.aspx; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Online
Database (2004), available at http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/ifsbrowser.aspx?branch=ROOT.
